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Liberty and the Normative Force of the Law in Montesquieu's The Spirit 
of the Laws 
Cory Wimberly 
Abstract 
The aim of this essay is explore what demands living in liberty places on citizens in Montesquieu's The 
Spirit of the Laws. In contrast to the ideas of liberty from many of the thinkers that were to follow him, 
Montesquieu's notion of liberty requires that citizens subject themselves to the regulative relationships 
required by his normative conception of the law. For Montesquieu, living in liberty is not just a situation 
in which one avoids what the law forbids and is otherwise left 'free' without interference and coercion. 
For Montesquieu, liberty is a positively elaborated ideal with normative demands and a set of ''necessary 
relations" that citizens must form. The result is that a life of liberty is defined in a significant way by the 
laws that bind a citizen because liberty is not the freedom to construct different ways of life, but the 
freedom to live securely within a particular way of life. I highlight this overlooked feature of The Spirit of 
the Laws by mobilizing Aron, Althusser and Durkheim's work on the law in Montesquieu to draw out the 
implications of Montesquieu's notion oflaw for liberty. 
We must face up to the implications of this theoretical revolution. It 
presupposes that it is possible to apply a Newtonian category oflaw 
to matters of politics and history. (Althusser, L. Politics and 
History, 34) 
Part of the joy and frustration in dealing with Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws lies in that it 
is work of tremendous innovation. It is exciting to deal with a host of new ideas being sorted out 
by a thinker who was committed to their originality and struggled with the vocabulary and 
structure to give them voice. Besides the excitement there is also the frustration that many have 
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of them. Although an older commentary, Levin's Political Doctrine of Montesquieu's perhaps 
gives the most direct voice to the puzzlement and exasperation that boils up in many secondary 
sources, "An essential preliminary task in presenting the political doctrine of the Esprit is to 
disentangle it from the chaotic mass of good things gone astray in which it is embedded" (Levin 
1936, 1). In another example, Rahe remarks that Montesquieu's definition of liberty is 
"puzzling" (2009, 33), while Richter calls it "notoriously ill-phrased" (1977, 95). Amidst this 
general agreement that parts of the text are somewhat opaque, it can be hard to draw a definitive 
line between what is unclear in The Spirit of the Laws (henceforth Esprit) and what is just 
insufficiently understood. Certainly, the line passes back and forth as interpretive arguments 
progress, pushing us to see that an assumption of ambiguity or vagueness in the text is really just 
an oversight by the readers, or that points that had been assumed to be clear are really more 
opaque than one might have believed. 
My aim here is to move new elements in the relationship between law and liberty from the 
'Puzzling' column to the 'Clear' column. I provide new perspective on the relationship between 
law and liberty through approaching Montesquieu's idea of liberty from an odd angle. Many of 
those who have explored Montesquieu's doctrine of liberty are approaching Montesquieu from a 
liberal point of view; one of the best examples of this is Pangle's Montesquieu's Philosophy of 
Liberalism. Pangle ascribes Montesquieu a forerunner's spot in the history of liberalism and 
certainly one cannot deny that Montesquieu had a tremendous influence on the history of liberal 
thought. However, we should also be attentive that Esprit predates the category of 'liberalism'; 
Larrere points out that the term 'liberal' did not appear until 1750, while Esprit was published in 
1748 (Larrere 2009, 280). I do not raise this issue to undermine or invalidate the previous work 
on Montesquieu and liberty by liberals, in fact this essay builds off that work, but I raise this 
issue to point out that Montesquieu did not see himself as working within a liberal orthodoxy and 
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extends Montesquieu's work on liberty in ways that would be unexpected if we were to 
understand him as a liberal, so I raise the issue of Montesquieu's relationship to liberalism in 
order that we might leave open space for him to deviate from the positions that one might expect 
from a liberal. 
Instead of approaching Montesquieu's notion of liberty from a liberal point of view, I approach it 
with an interpretation highly influenced by the French Marxists and sociologists Durkheim, Aron 
and Althusser. These authors investigate Montesquieu with a different focus than many other 
commentators on Montesquieu do. As thinkers working in the tradition of Marxist theory, the 
notions of individual freedom that Montesquieu put forward were not of primary interest to 
them, but as sociologists, they were quite interested in his work on the scientific laws that govern 
human life and society. These sociologists focus on his notion of the law, which allows him to 
reveal ''the nature and arrangement of the elements composing [societies]" (Durkheim 1960, 13). 
By approaching Montesquieu's notion of liberty through the French sociologists' work on law, 
we can come to see new facets and implications of Montesquieu's work on liberty that derive 
from his normative and relational view of the law. Durkheim, Althusser and Aron all stress the 
normative quality of law for Montesquieu and emphasize that the law is not just something that 
forbids particular actions but prescribes a particular nature or norm to them: 
Most of the rules he sets forth are truths-stated in another 
language-which science had already proven by its own 
methods. He is concerned, not with instituting a new political 
order, but with defining political norms (Durkheim 1960, 17). 
My contention is that the implications of Montesquieu's adoption of a normative conception of 
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requirements it places on the individual. The aim of this essay is explore to what demands living 
in a free nation places on citizens in Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws when the full 
ramifications of a normative form of the law are taken into account. In contrast to many of later 
liberal thinkers, Montesquieu's notion of liberty requires that the citizen subject themselves to 
the regulative relationships required by his normative conception of the law. Living in liberty 
therefore is not just a situation in which one avoids what the law forbids and is otherwise left to 
construct a life without interference and coercion. For Montesquieu, liberty in each nation is a 
positively elaborated ideal with normative demands and a set of "necessary relations" that 
citizens must form. The result is that a life of liberty is defined in a significant way by the laws 
that bind a citizen because liberty is not the freedom to construct different ways of life, but the 
freedom to live securely within the norms that govern a particular way of life. 
My concern with Montesquieu's notion of liberty is not just antiquarian, it also derives from an 
effort to grapple with the notion of liberty in our own time. Many thinkers have commented on 
the contemporary prevalence of normative institutions and laws, including Foucaultians, 
feminists, race theorists, critical theorists and others: 
With this new economy of power, the carceral system, which is 
[discipline's] basic instrument, permitted the emergence of a 
new form of' law': a mixture of legality and nature, prescription 
and constitution, the norm. [ ... ] The judges of normality are 
present everywhere. We are the society of the teacher-judge, the 
doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the 'social worker'-judge; it is 
on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and 
each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his 
body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements 
(Foucault 1995, 304). 
It has been a topic of recent interest to consider how freedom can be conceptualized and 
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such as McWhorter (2009), May (1994) and Winnubst (2006) have attempted to work through a 
notion of freedom commensurate with the exercise of normative power. Montesquieu offers us 
the advantage of an account of liberty informed by different historical concerns than our own. 
His difference from the present is the benefit he offers us in terms of the possible tools to escape 
the confines of the conceptual universe that binds our thought and to begin thinking in new ways 
that might dislodge some of the problems that confront us. Although this essay will not have the 
space to deal with this contemporary literature on normalizing power and liberty, my hope is 
more historical work like this will enable new thinking on the subject. 
This essay will proceed in four parts. First, I use Aron, Durkheim and Althusser to flesh out the 
'proto-sociological' approach Montesquieu took to politics and the impact it had on his idea of 
the law. I explore why, if we are to accept the sociologists' interpretation of the law in 
Montesquieu, we need to expand, but not necessarily refute or reject, much of the current 
thinking about his doctrine of liberty. Next, I flesh out the implications of a normative 
understanding of the law for Montesquieu's notion of liberty. Finally, I conclude by reviewing 
current literature on Montesquieu's ideas ofliberty in light of the contributions of this essay. 
Part I: The Law 
This section deals primarily with Montesquieu's account of the law in a way that is deeply 
influenced by the French sociological tradition. This is not to say that many of these same ideas 
on the normative role of the law cannot be found in other interpreters but that it is typically 
neither emphasized nor explored as deeply it is in the French thinkers, who make it a central 
concern. My aim here is to develop a notion of how the law operates in Montesquieu so that we 
are in a better position to evaluate the full extent of the meaning of liberty as ''the right to do 
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Law is often used in two quite different ways in theoretical discourse. In a negative or juridical 
usage, law typically exercises a forbidding function in the sense of outlawing a certain action. In 
this case, 'law' serves only to express a relationship of limitation in which, out of all possible 
actions, an individual is forbidden from carrying out the action forbidden by the law. For 
instance, a law might prohibit jaywalking or robbery but it would leave all of the other possible 
actions a person might undertake equally open for the individual to choose between. This is not 
the notion of the law Montesquieu had in mind and one can miss important aspects of his idea of 
liberty by approaching his understanding of law as a jurist might (Richter 1977, 67). 
In a second usage, law denotes a positive or normative relationship between two or more 
things-this notion of law is generally associated with the sciences. Montesquieu writes, "Laws, 
taken in their broadest meaning, are the necessary relations deriving from the nature of things; 
and in this sense, all beings have their laws: the divinity has its laws, the material world has its 
laws, then intelligences superior to man have their laws, the beasts have their laws, man has his 
laws" (Montesquieu 1989, 1.1). Law in this case does not describe so much what is forbidden as 
much as it describes exactly what something must do, how it must necessarily relate to the world 
around it. The planets follow the path of their regular orbit, just as water must boil when it is 
sufficiently heated, and human beings are of the nature to seek out each other's company; all of 
these parts of nature follow the "necessary relations" that "derive from the nature of things." 
Montesquieu again emphasizes that the law describes the norms within which relationships 
between things unfold in their positivity in the following quote: "laws are both the relations that 
exist between it and the different beings, and the relations of these various beings to each other" 
(Montesquieu 1989, 1.1). In comparison with a juridical usage of the law that bans one action but 
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and makes the other options impossible. Althusser highlights this normative usage of the law as 
revolutionary in the history of politics and history: 
We must face up to the implications of this theoretical 
revolution. It presupposes that it is possible to apply a 
Newtonian category of law to matters of politics and history. It 
presupposes that it is possible to draw from human institutions 
themselves the wherewithal to think their diversity in a 
uniformity and their changes in a constancy: the law of 
diversification and the law of their development (Althusser 
2007, 34). 
In Esprit, the law works like a kind of regularizing joint or hinge that defines how one thing can 
articulate itself in reference to another. Laws describe the web of relationships that, taken as a 
whole, define the persistent and positively articulated character of possibility, the "necessary 
relations" that define our world. 
Key here is to realize that Montesquieu sees the law prescribing for human beings a set of norms 
according to which they relate to the rest of being. Just as a scientist might describe the path a 
cannonball would follow if it came in contact with a certain force, Montesquieu wants to be able 
to describe the normative path that human society would follow given certain influences: 
Many things govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of 
the government, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a 
general spirit is formed as a result. 
To the extent that, in each nation, one of these causes acts more 
forcefully, the others yield to it. Nature and climate almost 
alone dominate savages; manners govern the Chinese; laws 
tyrannize Japan; in former times mores set the tone in 
Lacedaemonia; in Rome it was set by the maxims of 
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Montesquieu is careful to note that the influences on human beings are many, so that a scientific 
study of the laws that shape human behavior has to be complex and take into account many 
different causes and their interactions with one another. Nonetheless, the project to reveal the 
nature of the relationships that govern human beings is possible, even if exceedingly difficult. 
Montesquieu calls the host of all the regulative forces that govern a nation the general spirit. The 
general spirit is not one influence among many but the aggregate total of all of the many lawful 
forces acting on a group: 
The general spirit, then, is not a partial cause comparable to the 
others, but a product of that totality of physical, social and 
moral causes. [ ... ] The general spirit is not a ruling, all­
powerful cause which would do away with all of the others. It 
is, rather, that quality which a given collectivity acquires over a 
period of time as a result of the variety of influences upon it 
(Aron 1968, 45). 
The general spirit is like the resultant force vector that an object follows when it is acted upon by 
multiple forces; many forces may act upon an object to push it in different directions but, 
ultimately, the object can only follow one path, which is the result of the many different forces 
pushing upon it. It is the human scientist's job to work with this general spirit and come to 
understand the component parts that resulted in its final direction, to understand the "necessary 
relations" that together create the general spirit. 
Aron, Durkheim and Althusser are all keen to emphasize that in Montesquieu human life and 
human societies follow normative laws because this notion of the law makes the human sciences 
possible. If human beings operate in relationships that follow certain normal or regular paths, 
then one can work to discover the norms and their causes that define any particular society. For 




Minerva -An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 36-65 
prone to despotism as Montesquieu does, then one might hypothesize that the heat is related to 
the despotism: 
The heat of the climate can be so excessive that the body there 
will be absolutely without strength [ ... ] most chastisements 
there will be less difficult to bear than the action of the soul, 
and servitude will be less intolerable than the strength of spirit 
necessary to guide one's own conduct (Montesquieu 2006, 
XIV.2)
In this quote, Montesquieu traces the lassitude and lack of self-governance in hot climates to the 
action of the heat on the body. It is because that heat has a regular or normal range of effects on 
the body that he feels confident in voicing his results. However, if the law just worked negatively 
to forbid certain actions then one could not constitute a science because, outside of what was 
forbidden, what was actually done would be arbitrary and without rule: 
Ifwe assume, however, that there is no such causal relationship 
and that the effects can be produced without a cause or by any 
cause whatsoever, everything becomes arbitrary and fortuitous. 
But the arbitrary does not admit of interpretation. Hence, a 
choice must be made: either social phenomenon are 
incompatible with science or they are governed by the same 
laws as the rest of the universe (Durkheim 1960, 10). 
Here Durkheim argues that it is imperative to notice that Montesquieu's notion of the law is 
normative and prescriptive, otherwise we lose what makes his study unique as a first attempt at 
forming a human science. 
What has been discussed so far is law in the most general sense. We need to transition now from 
an exploration of an undistinguished and general notion of the law to an elaboration of 
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out liberty. As we will see, when Montesquieu speaks of the law in relation to liberty, he is 
referring to positive law (2006, XL 3). 
A section from Montesquieu in the opening book is helpful for beginning to understand positive 
law in its specificity from other types of law: 
These rules are a consistently established relation. Between one 
moving body and another moving body, it is in accord with 
relations of mass and velocity that all motions are received, 
increased, diminished, or lost; every diversity is uniformity, 
every change is consistency. 
Particular intelligent beings can have the laws that they have 
made, but they also have some that they have not made (2006, 
1.1). 
Human beings have many laws that they are subject to that they have not made and have no 
ability to alter-every child who tries to fly by jumping off of the garage is reminded of just how 
little effect their will has on some laws-but human beings also make some of their own laws 
and have the ability to create, modify and destroy them; positive laws fall into the latter category. 
In the above quote, Montesquieu gives voice to a dissymmetry in law in terms of its origins­
human beings create some laws, like positive law, while they inherit other kinds of laws-while 
also establishing a symmetry in that they both create the necessary and binding relationships 
between things that makes every diversity a "uniformity" and every change a "consistency." 
As a result of the normative character of created laws, these "made" laws have an interesting 
reflexive property. The reflexive property of human created laws are due to the way that they are 
established as a result of the way other laws govern human beings and they also come 
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them. In other words, the laws that people make are expressions of the general spirit that then 
come to compose and alter that general spirit. 
We must be careful, as positive law is not the only law that people create that in turn acts back 
on them to regulate their future behavior. We must distinguish positive laws from these other 
forces. Here, Montesquieu distinguishes positive law from manners and mores: 
Mores and manners are usages that laws have not established, 
or that they have not been able, or have not wanted, to establish. 
The difference between laws and mores is that, while laws 
regulate the actions of the citizen, mores regulate the actions of 
the man. The difference between mores and manners is that the 
first are more concerned with internal, and the latter external, 
conduct (Montesquieu 2006, XIX.16). 
Laws, mores and manners are all three human made laws that create binding norms for human 
relationships. Positive law forms a subset of these human created laws that is unique in that 
establishes the relations that regulate people in their guise as citizens; in other words, the positive 
laws regulate people insofar as they are subjects of a particular public or state apparatus. Positive 
law carries the weight of establishing the necessary relations between the individual, other 
citizens and the state. When positive law works well it establishes relations that build the unity 
of the citizenry and the state: 
We have just seen that the laws of education should have a 
relation to the principle of each government. It is the same for 
the laws the legislator gives to society as a whole. This relation 
between the laws and the principle tightens all the springs of the 
government, and the principle in turn receives a new force from 
the laws. Thus, physical motion and action is always followed 
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Here Montesquieu is concerned to point out that legislation will alter the relationships between 
the citizenry and the state and care must be taken in crafting the law so that it strengthens that 
relationship and ''tightens all the springs of government." If the positive laws are in harmony 
with the principle of the government, then it will work to reinforce the government by 
strengthening or creating relations with the citizenry that reinforces its guiding principle. 
Likewise, we can invert his proposition to conclude that a law that is created according to a 
principle counter to that of the current government will require relationships to be established 
that will undermine the government, weaken it and deplete its forces. 
It is precisely because the laws establish a host of necessary relations that legislators have to be 
wise in crafting them; a positive law impacts, to a greater or lesser degree, the relations that exist 
between things within the nation. When one creates a positive law, one puts in place a set of 
norms that will interact with all of the other forces acting on human society and the legislator 
must take care that the effect is positive. Put otherwise, the spirit of the laws interacts with and 
modifies the general spirit and so those that craft positive laws need to be careful to create laws 
that will have the proper effects on the general spirit: 
Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are 
made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit 
another. Laws must relate to the nature and the principle of the 
government that is established or that one wants to establish, 
whether those laws form it as do political laws, or maintain it, 
as do civil laws. 
They should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to 
the climate, be it freezing torrid, or temperate; to the properties 
of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of life of the 
peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should 
relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to 
the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, 
their number, their commerce, their mores and their manners; 
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purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which 
they are established. They must be considered from all these 
points of view. 
This is what I undertake to do in this work. I shall examine all 
these relations; together they form what is called THE SPIRIT 
OF THE LAWS (Montesquieu 2006, 1.3). 
This quote from Montesquieu reveals that positive laws are a normative force on human beings 
but that positive law is not the only normative force. Positive law comes into being in a situation 
in which there are always already other normative influences. The climate, the terrain, wealth 
and other factors exhibit a regulative and shaping influence on human beings; "a wise legislator" 
would recognize these other normative factors and seek to create positive law that interacts with 
them in the desired way to produce a beneficial result (Montesquieu 2006, VI.13). A positive 
law created in one country may not have the same effect as the same law in another country with 
different forces at play; for instance, Montesquieu remarks that a Roman law forbidding "men to 
keep more than sixty sesterces in their houses" was a great success in Rome while in France a 
similar law ''was catastrophic" (2006, XXIX.6). 
Montesquieu's analysis of the effects of positive law is not a simple one; he does not just confine 
his study of the relations established by a law to those to the explicitly named in a legislative 
text. Montesquieu recognizes that laws have effects beyond their intended consequences and 
beyond what the text may explicitly state: for example, positive laws set precedents for other 
laws and alter the course of future legislation; they interact with other positive laws to have a 
combinatory effect that is beyond what either of the them would have had alone; a positive law 
may have a symbolic effect that inflames or pacifies a nation; laws may encourage shifts in 
manners, mores and/or religion that will impact the stability of the government, etc. When 
Montesquieu considers positive law he does not restrict his analysis of its effects to those 
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relationships, only some of which might be named in the body of the law. As a result, 
Montesquieu argues that he is not so much worried about whether a law belongs in particular 
category or another but with the spirit of the law, the total effect it has in terms of establishing 
regulative relationships within the nation: 
I have made no attempt to separate political from civil laws, for, 
as I do not treat laws but the spirit of the laws, and as this spirit 
consists in the various relations that laws may have with various 
things, I have had to follow the natural order of laws less than 
that of these relations and of these things (2006, 1.3). 
Here we learn that Montesquieu is not interested in chasing after the ideal stated by the law as 
much as what it establishes in practice-a set of relations that is likely much larger than what the 
text is likely to reflect. Here the spirit of the law is similar to the general spirit, both are terms are 
meant to capture to the totality of the effective regulative laws established. Montesquieu wants to 
capture the "spirit of the laws" in terms of the entirety of effects a law has on society. 
What we need to take away from our discussion of law to our next section on liberty is that 
positive laws do not just forbid certain actions; positive laws exert a normative power over 
citizens to compel them to establish particular relationships with the world around them. 
Although an unwise legislator may not recognize the way that their law will work to necessitate 
new relationships and modify existing ones, their laws will nonetheless have those effects. 
Positive law creates an obligation on the part of the law-abiding citizen that extends far beyond 
just avoiding what the law forbids; following the law means entering into relationships that 
require one to articulate oneself in a particular way in regards to any number of possible objects: 
other citizens, one's wealth, marriage, property, etc. Positive law creates relationships that exert 
a regulative and normative impact on the citizen's life that will alter its necessary character and, 
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Part II: Liberty and the Law 
In this section, we will revisit Montesquieu's ideas of liberty-which are based in part on his 
notion of the law-making sure to keep at the forefront of our analysis the normative qualities of 
the law. Liberty has two primary facets for Montesquieu, liberty in relation to the constitution 
and liberty in relation to the citizen; we will have to look at both facets in order to flesh out the 
full implications of his notion of law for liberty. Liberty in relation to the constitution details 
how the government must be arranged in order to permit liberty, while political liberty discusses 
how this liberty will appear in relation to the individual citizen. 
Liberty in relation to the constitution is described in four lines: 
It is true that in democracies the people seem to do what they 
want, but political liberty in no way consists in doing what one 
wants. In a state, that is, in a society where there are laws, 
liberty can consist only in having the power to do what one 
should want to do and in no way being constrained to do what 
one should not want to do. 
One must put oneself in mind of what independence is and what 
liberty is. Liberty is the right to do everything that the laws 
permit; and if one citizen could do what they forbid, he would 
no longer have liberty because the others would likewise have 
this same power (Montesquieu 2006, XI.3). 
The first line of each paragraph reminds us that liberty is not a freedom to do whatever one 
wants; in other words, liberty is not independence. Independence bears a complicated 
relationship to liberty. While independence might seem to be the freest form of existence, in 
practice it is not. Although when one is independent one is not limited from undertaking any 
particular actions by positive law, one's independence disrupts the rule of law and opens one up 




Minerva -An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 36-65 
For Montesquieu, the purpose or nature of government in 
general is the creation of security, or freedom, for its citizens­
freedom from domination and from threat of death or attack by 
other men. The purpose of government is to use the power of 
the state to suppress the natural war among individuals (Pangle 
1973, 49). 
In this sense, it is the law that creates a zone of liberty because the law is not so much a limit to 
freedom as what makes it possible through creating security. Without the law, one would not be 
free from the unjust and coercive interference of others and hence, one would have to live in a 
relationship of fear with the world. The law is not truly a limit on freedom but it is what makes 
untroubled liberty possible, "Life under the law is the only life which is secure and therefore 
free" (Pangle 1973, 110). At the same time, independence is not free because it implies a 
freedom from the law that would put one at risk of harm from others. 
The second sentences in both paragraphs on constitutional liberty speak to the relationship of 
liberty to the law and are of central interest to us. We should keep in mind what was just said in 
regards to the law: Montesquieu does not understand law in the sense a jurist might, what ''the 
laws permit" is not just the sum total of things that are not forbidden. What ''the laws permit" in 
different political situations is positive and normatively defined; it comprises a list not just of 
what one should not do but the relationships that must be maintained. This becomes even clearer 
if we look to the first formulation of liberty in the quote, ''the power to do what one should want 
to do." 'What one should want to do' highlights the normative character of the law in relation to 
space for action protected by liberty. After all, Montesquieu does not say that liberty is not doing 
what the law says one should not do; liberty is undertaking the positive action that one should 
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What should one want to do? We must recognize that for Montesquieu the law is not only 
normative but it is also variable from society to society. For Montesquieu, the spirit of the laws 
and the relations that they demand are different when different governing relations are present. 
Different climates, terrains, ways of life, religions, numbers of inhabitants, commerce, mores and 
manners all are part of the variable general spirit that determine what type of political regime is 
developed. Depending on the mix of forces that makes up the general spirit, one can end up with 
a number of different political regimes: a republic, monarchy, despotism or a hybrid of them. 
The importance of this to liberty is that what "one should want to do" will be different depending 
on which type of regime one lives in. For instance, Montesquieu argues that in a monarchy one 
must live for "honor," while in a despotism one must live in "fear," while in democracy one must 
live in ''virtue" (Montesquieu 1989, 111.6; IIl.9; 111.3). The citizenry of different types of regimes 
need to be differently constituted and maintain a different spirit for the regimes to be successful. 
A monarchy is unlikely to be successful, for instance, if the people in it behave as if they were in 
a democracy. So, although liberty consists in "having the power to do what one should want to 
do," what this means in practice will differ as the character of the laws differ in their normative 
impact: 
Given the type of state, the system of laws must follow. 
Montesquieu follows the causal sequence still further. Not 
content to show that the laws depend upon the form of the 
society, he seeks out the causes upon which the form of society 
itself depends and, among these causes, the one that plays the 
major role, that is, the volume of the society (Durkheim 1960, 
37). 
Unlike the American Bill of Rights, liberty for Montesquieu does not consist in any cross-cultural 
or transnational set of rights or protected list of activities; what one should do, and hence what is 
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that is determined according to the nature and principle of the regime that the individual lives 
under. 
In relation to the constitution, liberty will be made manifest in a nation if the structure of a 
government compels its officials and the people ruled by it to act within the norms required by 
the law; in other words, liberty will reign if the constitution can compel people to do what they 
ought to do. To do this, the constitution must establish a governmental structure that encourages 
adherence to the particular normative qualities that make that society what it is. For instance, 
Montesquieu writes that a democracy must be motivated by a "love of equality" (2006, V.3). The 
love of equality is the desire to neither be lesser nor greater than others in the republic, whether 
in terms of wealth, power, or otherwise. For the reason of equality, Montesquieu argues that a 
democracy is most naturally formed and maintained when the lands are divided as equally as 
possible and the people have a desire for frugality and so do not desire to become wealthier than 
one another (2006, V.6). It is the role of the constitution of a democracy to make sure that the 
basis for society remains hospitable for democracy because "inequality will enter at the point not 
protected by the laws, and the republic will be lost" (2006, V.5). Without the material, social 
and economic basis for a democratic society remaining intact, the society would be subject to 
upheaval and social transformation-all of which threatens security and stability and opens the 
individual to lawless actions by others. Through our emphasis on the normative quality of the 
law, we can see that making sure that people do what "'they should want to do" involves 
maintaining an extensive set of social norms. A free nation must have the ability to maintain its 
normative standards by compelling its citizens to act according to the relationships defmed by 
the law, otherwise the society will falter, the rule oflaw will fail and people will be subject to the 
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Before we move on to liberty in relation to the citizen, we need to complicate this notion of 
liberty in relation to the constitution yet further. For, although the constitution must preserve the 
normative basis of society, in other words, keeping people doing what they ought to do, there are 
many forms of government that cannot achieve this task. There is a functional contradiction in 
trying to get most of the forms of government to embody liberty. Most obviously, despotism is a 
political system constructed around the whims of an all-powerful leader who rules based on fear. 
Such a government cannot be held to a constitution as the despot cannot be reliably held to it; 
despotism ''has no rule" of law but only the rule by a despot who "is strong only because he can 
take life away" (Montesquieu 2006, 11.8). Such a society has no stable law, no stable order and 
little in the way of security for its citizens. So, although constitutional liberty is at one level 
compatible with all sorts of varied political regimes in that its aim is to maintain the rule oflaw, 
in practice there are not many types of regimes in which power is distributed in such a way that 
all of the members of the government can reliably be held responsible to the law. 
The failure of liberty in certain types of regimes is interesting for what it says about the inability 
of those regimes to maintain their own normative basis. In nations whose form is inherently 
hostile to liberty---despotism especially but also democracy and aristocracy-the norms that 
compose the state are constantly being undermined and transformed (Montesquieu 2006, XI.3). 
Such unstable regimes constantly cause their own downfall because they cannot maintain the 
rule of law, they cannot maintain adherence to the necessary relationships that define their 
particular form of government. In their inability to maintain the rule of law, where law reflects 
not just certain forbidden actions but also the spirit that makes the regime what it is, these nations 
destroy their own basis. In the case of democracy, the heavy handed and abusive pursuit of virtue 
can undo liberty: "Who would think it! Even virtue has need of limits" (Montesquieu 2006, 
XI.4). The over-aggressive pursuit of the virtue of each citizen can put the moral police in a
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themselves above them. One can imagine how impossible it would be to maintain an equal and 
democratic balance of power if those with whom one was disagreeing with had the power to, say, 
burn one at the stake for heresy. Likewise, a lack of moral authority in a democracy can cause 
the degeneration of the virtue necessary to a democracy and "When that virtue ceases, ambition 
enters those hearts that can admit it, and avarice enters them all" (Montesquieu 2006, 111.3). A 
democracy is predisposed to become an aristocracy or despotism either by giving someone the 
too great power to monitor and enforce virtue or it is prone to the birth of ambition through a lax 
enforcement of virtue. Either way, democracy is prone to undermine the very norms that sustain 
it-just as the other immoderate regimes are as well. As a result, a democracy is not a nation that 
can exist in liberty as it tends to promote its citizens doing what they should not want to do, 
"Democracy and aristocracy are not free states by their nature" (Montesquieu 2006, Xl.4). 
Montesquieu's analysis of the English constitution makes sense in this light as it is a constitution 
that has "political liberty for its direct purpose" by insuring that everyone follows the law (2006, 
XI.5). The English split their government into three branches, the executive, legislative, and the
judicial, in order that each of the three parts might exercise a check on each other's power to act 
outside of the law. The English constitution is an exemplary execution of liberty: it provides a 
series of powers that force each other to act according to the law. 
The English constitution works to uphold liberty not just by preventing certain individuals from 
doing what is forbidden, it also directs them to act in consonance with the general spirit of the 
nation: 
The form of these three powers should be rest or inaction. But 
as they are constrained to move by the necessary motion of 
things, they will be forced to move in concert (Montesquieu 
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In this quote, Montesquieu describes the way that government works in the terms of physics: 
government must be made to follow the "necessary motion of things", to have a certain kind of 
motion that follows a prescribed path. In the case of the English constitution, it requires all three 
powers to act in "concert," to act in harmony with the general spirit. Any power that sought to 
act to increase its share of the power would be opposed by the other two powers thus insuring 
that all of the parts of government act within their sphere and according to its prescribed 
function. Liberty in the constitution exists when the government is constructed in such a way that 
people do what they ought to do, which is not just to avoid breaking the law, but adhering to the 
normative spirit of the laws. 
The second aspect of liberty, political liberty, "consists in security or, at least, in the opinion one 
has of one's security" (Montesquieu 1989, 11.2). If liberty is taken care of at the level of the 
constitution by insuring that the government must follow the law through a system of checks and 
balances, then the citizen's security should not be threatened by the abuse of power by 
government officials. However, security may still be threatened by private citizens who seek to 
manipulate the power of the government with false accusations: ''this security is never more 
attacked than by public or private accusations. Therefore, the citizen's liberty depends 
principally on the goodness of the criminal laws" (XIl.2). Proper enforcement is important for 
the obvious reason that if one is falsely accused while one is doing what one should, then one's 
ability to do what one should, i.e. one's liberty, is roundly under attack. 
Montesquieu's concern for security goes beyond moderating government power and preventing 
false accusations; his concern for security extends to the much broader field of the general 
maintenance of social norms. Montesquieu tasks it to the police to maintain order and security: "I 
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while disturbing tranquility, attack security at the same time" (Xll.4). To understand this last 
quote and its implications for liberty, we must understand that the police in France during the 
17th and 18th centuries are not the same police of today. Foucault, in his recently published 
lecture course Security, Territory, Population, spends a significant portion considering the role 




century, especially in France. He most generally defines the role
of police as "the set of means by which the state's forces can be increased while preserving the 
state in good order" (2007, 313). Already this should indicate to us that the police are not 
primarily about upholding negative state power in the form of interdictions; the police aim to 
create a general situation in which the state's forces are maximized and kept in good order, i.e. 
they maintain the general spirit. The tactics used by the police centered on regulation, the 
transformation of a situation to meet certain normative goals: 
We are in a world of indefinite regulation, of permanent, 
continually renewed, and increasingly detailed regulation, but 
always regulation, always in that kind of form that, if not 
judicial, is nevertheless juridical: the form of the law, or at least 
of law as it functions in a mobile, permanent, and detailed way 
in the regulation (Foucault 2007, 340). 
A "breach of the police" is a breach of the good order, the specific order of improvements that 
the police are constantly seeking to deploy and then improve upon. Montesquieu's discourse on 
law in the section on liberty should be striking indication to his reader that liberty is not a place 
where one can do whatever one wants as long as it is not forbidden. Liberty is a situation in 
which one is secure in doing what one should and that security is provided by a whole series of 
forces that seek to maintain the spirit of the laws and the general spirit. 
It is at this point the emphasis on the operation of laws in a normative fashion begins most 
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not a liberal non-interference or independence, it is the ability to freely act out one's life as long 
as one constrains oneself to act according to the norms that the laws spell out. Liberty does not 
consist in an infinite number of possibilities to become whatever one would like to be; liberty 
consists in a certain number of ways of living a life in concert with the spirit of the laws. Living 
in liberty is doing what one "should want to do," which is defined following the "necessary 
relations" that stem from the laws. If people act outside of the law and establish relations with 
things, fellow citizens, or between the government and the governed that strike against the norms 
established by the law, then liberty is threatened in its relationship to the constitution and the 
individual citizen. If one is setting up illicit relationships then one is undermining the spirit on 
which the government rests by developing connections that follow another spirit. 
As a result of Montesquieu's examination of the normative laws that sustain particular types of 
societies, he defines security as the maintenance of those norms through government moderation 
and the policing of those norms. Security could not be maintained through just preventing illegal 
actions-for instance, the fact that most people are not robbed does not imply that people are 
acting according to the principle and nature of the nation-security is only maintained when the 
unique spirit of the nation holds strong and constrains the relationships that people form to work 
within the spirit of the laws. Due to the specificity with which governments define norms via the 
law, living in liberty may be quite difficult, constraining, and involve constant work to embody 
successful conduct as defined by the law. For Montesquieu, liberty involves the whole of society, 
from the government, to commerce, to individuals in their manners and mores acting in 
consonance with the normative relations that make the collectivity what it is. As we noticed, 
certain political forms are not able to sustain their own spirit and so they fall to revolution and 




Minerva -An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 36-65 
Liberty in Montesquieu may seem off to those of us that grew up in the liberal nations of the 
west. Liberty is certainly not defined by maximizing non-interference by the government or 
one's neighbors; liberty is the freedom to live in a secure, stable regime in which one can count 
on the law being followed and, hence, the spirit of the nation continuing on. This liberty is a 
liberty of peace, regularity and constancy. The type of liberty that Montesquieu favors does not 
work by making the maximal allowable room for difference and pluralism within the nation, for 
one to constitute oneself, one's life and one's family however one would like without 
interference from one's neighbor. Of course, certain differences of social class, occupation, etc. 
are necessary for a society to maintain its spirit-I am not arguing that Montesquieu puts in place 
a framework that encourages perfect homogeneity-but that the different social actors allowable 
within a nation are defined by its spirit which restricts the number and types of different social 
roles (Larrere 2009, 292-3). Where Montesquieu is most tolerant of difference and perhaps most 
seeks to protect it is in the plurality of norms that compose the different nations and necessitate 
different laws: 
Different countries have different objectives. This is why 
political good is plural: there are as many political goods as 
their situations in place or time. This leads Montesquieu to 
reject the idea of a unique good, applicable to all places and 
times alike (Larrere 2009, 289). 
This pluralism is difference preserved across nations, which means little in terms of the 
opportunities to an individual to construct different ways of life unless the individual has 
opportunities to emigrate to those nations. Montesquieu finds liberty reigns when the law and the 
norms it necessitates are followed. That in itself is freedom: the freedom to live one's life with 
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Part III: Implications for Current Work on Liberty: 
What this interpretation of liberty adds to the literature is a more detailed sense of the normative 
burden liberty places on the citizen in Montesquieu. Exploring Montesquieu's understanding of 
liberty in concert with the French sociologists' emphasis of the normative role of the law reveals 
the extensive restrictions that liberty places on one's possibilities to construct different forms of 
conduct by limiting one to live in compliance with the law. As I have understood law through 
the French sociological tradition, liberty is a normative framework that specifies a range of 
positively elaborated conduct and, as a result, acting within the law means much more than just 
avoiding what the law forbids. To some extent, this issue appears to be off of the radar of many 
of Montesquieu's commentators. Raher, for instance, does not consider it all: he is certainly 
detailed on the restrictions and duties of the government in a free state but he does not detail how 
the people must constitute themselves as citizens to maintain liberty (Rahe, 2009). Pangle very 
briefly considers the issue in a paragraph of his book, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism, 
but when he does it seems to me that he relies more on a later liberal notions than on a close 
reading of Esprit: 
Montesquieu identifies liberty with a life lived under the rule of 
law. A man is free only when he limits his doing as he wishes to 
activities not forbidden by law (Pangle 1973, 109-110). 
This notion of liberty as the freedom to do whatever the law does not forbid might be found in 
Locke or Mill, but I do not think this is the idea we find in Montesquieu. Ultimately, I think 
Pangle might agree with me, as the little work he does on this subject is in significant tension 
with the more elaborate comments he makes later. At the end of the same chapter in which he is 
considering the importance of England in the Esprit, he ends by emphasizing that England is 
only able to maintain its liberty because its citizenry establishes the distinctive normative 
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Montesquieu did not wish to simply mirror English society. He 
rather looked to what he believed to be the most portentous 
characteristics of England, the qualities and the spirit which he 
hoped and believed would shape the future of the world. The 
English constitution and its way of life is to be the guide, the 
polestar in political affairs (Pangle 1973, 160). 
In contradiction to his earlier lines, here Pangle emphasizes that liberty is possible in England 
only because the citizenry have adopted a particular ''way of life" that reflects a certain "spirit." 
Although the rest of the world would not be able to adopt tout court the English spirit and way of 
life, they could still serve as a normative "polestar" from which others might begin to craft their 
own regulative ideals. Pangle's insight here is spot-on in my estimation and it speaks to the 
argument I have made in this paper in terms of the relationship between the law and liberty; here 
he emphasizes that liberty requires adherence to certain norms guiding the way of life of the 
citizenry. 
Although the issue of how the law constrains individuals to constitute themselves as free subjects 
has not generally been a focus in the interpretation of Esprit, we can see that Pangle is not alone 
in attributing a later liberal notion to Montesquieu: 
Rather than assume the existence of a governmental prerogative 
to regulate human conduct in all areas not fenced off from 
interference by explicit legal protections, he preferred to adopt 
the view that citizens may only be compelled to do what the law 
obliges. Beyond that, they are by definition free (Carrithers 
2001, 24). 
Although Carrithers and Pangle generally have excellent readings of Montesquieu's notion of 
liberty, I think a reflection on what obedience to the law requires does not let one interpret the 
burden of liberty on the citizen to be just avoiding what the law forbids. The law in Montesquieu 
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valid choices. The law prescribes the "necessary relations" that pertain between individuals and 
their world and so it places a much higher normative demand on the conduct of the individual. In 
regards to liberty, this means that doing what "one should want to do" and protecting the security 
of the citizen under the laws involves following a positively defined spirit. 
In a larger context, the Esprit brings into relief the difficulty adjudicating between a collectivity 
that only is what it is because it adheres to certain norms and the freedoms promised by liberty 
that may well undermine those norms. Certainly, there are many people today in war tom and 
uncertain nations who would find it a great freedom to be able to wake up the next day and find 
out that the world is much the same as they left it when they went to bed. For them, 
Montesquieu's focus on favoring the stability of the nation would have top priority. Freedom 
would make sense as security and lawfulness. However, many people may find the stability of 
their nations to be precisely what disturbs them in that the nation constrains them to a way of life 
they find demeaning, oppressive, and hostile. For these latter people, liberty may indicate the 
ability to challenge, change or disregard social norms in the creation of one's own way of life­
this is not a notion of liberty Montesquieu embraces. Montesquieu's place in this debate is clear: 
he offers us a notion of liberty as security. In the Esprit, liberty is not to be found in the ability of 
individuals to act without interference and to conduct themselves with only the minimal 
constraint of avoiding what is illegal. Liberty is to be found in the security that comes with a 
protected, stable and enduring way of life in which the law remains constant and life is in many 
ways predictable. 
Although Montesquieu's notion of liberty may go against the grain of much of the common 
wisdom of liberal political practice today, I think it is a notion that we are much closer to than it 
might first appear. We are societies that give great credence to the social sciences. We seek 
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sciences. These social sciences direct us to the environmental and genetic causes of our behavior 
so that we can understand, if not change, who we are. If human life and conduct reflect their 
lawful and regular responses to the forces around them, then it may well be that a more 
libertarian notion of freedom premised on the minimization of interference from others does not 
earn us much. After all, if we are constrained to act according to the laws that bind us, then 
giving a wide berth for the individual to conduct themselves outside of those norms is just to 
fight human nature. Our belief in the power of the social sciences to determine the causes of our 
behavior brings us closer than we might think to Montesquieu who apparently did not find much 
use in a definition of liberty premised on a freedom to create many different ways of life. If 
human life follows rules, then what else should freedom be besides the ability to follow those 
rules in security? 
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